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## ПАЛЕСТИНА ЖАНА ИЗРАИЛЬ ЧЫР-ЧАТАКТАРЫ

### ПАЛЕСТИНО-ИЗРАИЛЬСКИЙ КОНФЛИКТ

#### PALESTINE AND ISRAEL CONFLICT

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**Аннотациясы:** Макалада Палестина жана Израилдин чыр-чатагынын өнүгүшүнүн социалдык-экономикалык, коомдук-саясий жана идеологиялык себептерин, ошондой эле Жакынкы Чыгыш менен жөнгө салуунун негизги чараларын карап чыгуу. Конфликт азыркыга чейин жөнгө салынбаган бойдон калуунун себептери каралган.

**Негизги сөздөр:** Жакынкы Чыгыш, Палестина, Израил, чыр-чатактар, идеологиялык себептери, жонго салуу жолдору.

**Аннотация:** В статье рассматриваются социально-экономические, общественно-политические и идеологические причины развития арабо-израильского конфликта, а также основные меры по ближневосточному урегулированию. Определяются причины, по которым конфликт до сих пор остается неурегулированным.

**Ключевые слова:** Ближний Восток, Палестина, Израиль, конфликт, идеологические причины, урегулирование.

**Abstract:** We consider the socio-economic, socio-political and ideological reasons of the development of the conflict. The article also examines main features of the peacekeeping process in the Palestine and the reasons why the conflict is still unresolved.

**Key words:** Middle East, Palestine, Israel, conflict, ideological reasons, settlement.

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The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the longest and most difficult to resolve, and the process of its peaceful resolution remains the most relevant for the entire world community for more than a decade. Attempts at peacemaking have not led to lasting and lasting results, and in terms of the degree of conflict in the region, the conflict has a pronounced tendency to increase. One of the characteristic reasons that the conflict is poorly resolved is that each "peaceful breakthrough" is usually followed by a rollback to a new confrontation. This generates a certain pessimism among the warring parties and their international sponsors. In some cases, it is even suggested that the Arab-Israeli conflict has no solution at all in the foreseeable future. At the same time, despite the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be wrong to define it as "absolutely insoluble" [1]. The beginning of the Middle East conflict should be attributed to the 40s of the XX century, which is connected with the problem of creating Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. This decision was made on November 29, 1947, when the UN General Assembly voted for the creation of two states - Jewish and Arab - on the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as the international zone of Jerusalem (Resolution No. 181). 33 states voted for the partition of Palestine (including France, the USA and the Soviet Union), 13 voted against, 10 abstained (including Great Britain) [2, p. 213]. However, as far as the Arab world is concerned, this decision was initially rejected by both the neighboring Arab States and the Arab population of Palestine itself. The Arabs unanimously did not want to recognize the idea of the return of Jews to Palestine, considering this territory their own. From that moment, open clashes between Jewish and Arab armed groups began.

One of the largest conferences on the settlement of the Middle East conflict is considered to be the Madrid Conference, which was held from October 30 to November 1, 1991. The organizers of the conference were the Soviet Union and the United States of America, their efforts were aimed at other Arab countries to follow the example of Egypt and sign peace treaties with Israel. Also, the parties to the conflict had to fulfill the requirements of Security Council Resolutions No. 242 of November 22, 1967 and No. 338 of October 22, 1973, providing for the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the right of all States in the region to independent existence within recognized borders ("peace in exchange for land"), ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, achieving security and peace for Israelis [3, p. 159]. The conference worked for only 3 days, but its significance cannot be overlooked, if only because for the first time all parties to the conflict met at the negotiating table [4, p. 148]. The most important outcome of the Madrid meeting was that the parties adopted the formula of subsequent direct negotiations: "peace in exchange for territory" [5, p. 24]. But the concretization of this process took as much as 2 years. Despite the fact that the heads of Arab delegations, as well as Yitzhak Shamir, who was the Prime Minister of Israel at that time and headed the Israeli delegation, stated that they were striving to conclude peace in the Middle East, as well as clearly outlined ways to bilateral direct negotiations and recognition of common interests by the parties to the conflict, the conference did not give real results [6, p. 264]. The next stage in the settlement of the Arab -Israeli conflict was the secret negotiations between the Israeli delegation led by Sh . Peres and the PLO delegation led by Abu-Alla, held in Oslo on August 20, 1993 with the mediation of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Israel and the PLO announced mutual recognition, and the latter undertook to annul the paragraph of the Palestinian National Charter (its program document) demanding the destruction of Israel; the parties agreed to cease all hostile actions against each other, Israel promised to release the Arabs sentenced to prison on charges of hostile activities [7, p. 675]. The bilateral negotiations ended with the signing of the Joint Declaration of Principles in Washington on September 13, 1993. The document provided for the introduction of local self-government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for a period of up to 5 years, which was to lead to a permanent settlement [8].

The fact that almost all fundamental issues remained open allowed for different interpretations of the agreement. Thus, the Israeli side believed that the treaty opened the way to peace and cooperation, to the final inclusion of the whole of Jerusalem into the Jewish state and, possibly, to the preservation of Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. For its part, the PLO viewed the

agreement as another victory in the struggle of the Palestinian people for national liberation, as a step towards the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and the complete elimination of Israeli settlements [9, pp. 99-100]. In general, the Oslo peace talks did not lead to anything, because they did not resolve any key issues: the independence of Palestine has not yet been proclaimed, refugees cannot return to their former places of residence, the status of Jerusalem has not been determined. Moreover, the agreements laid down binding deadlines for achieving a "final" settlement. Negotiations on a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians were to begin no later than at the beginning of the third year of the interim settlement agreements (May 1996) and end by May 4, 1999. [8]

At the same time, no recommendations and agreements were developed on the forms of coexistence of the two peoples after this date. Initially, it was assumed that the negotiations on an interim settlement would not include the most controversial and difficult issues, such as issues related to the status of Jerusalem, the possible return or payment of compensation to Palestinian refugees, the future of Jewish settlements in controlled territories. There was a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the discussion of the most problematic issues was postponed and no "intermediate" mechanisms for their resolution were developed; on the other hand, a clear and unambiguous deadline for reaching agreement on these issues was established [10, p. 176]. Thus, the negotiation process in Oslo can be characterized in such a way that, first of all, it is necessary to start negotiations so that positive dynamics appear and mutual trust of the parties to the conflict arises, and then other "deferred" issues will be resolved by themselves on this joyful note. On March 28, 2002, an official Arab initiative was adopted by the League of Arab States in Beirut. It was approved in the form of a final document called the Arab Peace Initiative. It contains four important points: 1. Israel completely withdraws from the occupied lands (including the Golan Heights and Shebaa farms). 2. Israel recognizes an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. 3. Israel will allow the Palestinian refugees to return. 4. In exchange for this, the Arab states will establish "normal relations" with him and will not encroach on Israel's security [11].

Despite the fact that Israel welcomes the initiative as a basis for negotiations and normalization of relations with Arab countries, the Israeli Government has not yet given an official response to the Arab League initiative. Israel refuses to completely leave the occupied territories and opposes the return of Palestinian refugees, but Arab League representatives have repeatedly stated that the Arab world will not settle with the Jewish State if the conditions of the peace initiative are not met. Three years after the failure of peace talks with the Palestinian Authority and the beginning of a new wave of terror and violence, many peace initiatives have already appeared, the most high-profile of which was, perhaps, the "Road Map". The text of the plan was prepared by the Quartet, consisting of representatives of the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations, and was submitted to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority on April 30, 2003. The Roadmap is a three-stage plan for the final and full-scale settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005 by creating an independent democratic and viable Palestinian state based on the formula "peace in exchange for territories" and UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242, No. 338 and No. 1397 [12]. Adjusted according to the amendments of the Israeli and Palestinian sides and approved by them, this draft was approved by a special UN Security Council resolution of November 19, 2003 and today retains the status of the only officially valid Middle East peace settlement plan.

Despite the fact that the plan was formally adopted by both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, already at the time of its proclamation, a number of analysts managed to regard it as "impossible". An important substantive argument against the "Road Map" inside Israel was the reference to the fact that this plan will be another concession to the Arabs, who react to any concessions with an escalation of aggression. As evidence, the negative "Oslo experience" was cited, when, having given part of Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River to the Arabs, Israel received a series of terrorist attacks in response [13]. But it is particularly interesting that some provisions of the Roadmap plan have

caused contradictions not only among the participants in the conflict, but also among the participants of the Middle East Quartet. The first controversial moment appeared immediately after the June speech of George W. Bush and his statement that the United States would support the creation of a Palestinian state only on condition that "the Palestinian people will have new leaders." new institutions of power and a new organization of security measures with neighboring states." It was obvious that this statement implied the unacceptability of Yasser Arafat as the leader of the PNA and a participant in future peace negotiations. However, Russia, the EU and the UN recognized Ya. Arafat as the only legitimately elected leader of the Palestinian people [14, p. 191]. The disputes of the Quartet member countries also concerned their powers to monitor compliance with the agreements and Washington's more active position in resolving the conflict, as well as the issue of the construction of Jewish settlements. The United States believed that Israel should continue building them while the terrorist attacks by the Palestinians continued. The European Union, on the other hand, advocated an immediate cessation by Israel of the construction of new settlements without preconditions [15, p. 187].

Thus, it can be concluded that if the initiators of the "Road Map" cannot find consensus among themselves on a number of issues, then it is quite obvious that the parties to the conflict will also not be able to reach mutual understanding and come to an agreement by implementing the provisions of the plan. If we turn to the text of the "Road Map" itself, we can see that it says almost nothing about such important problems as the problem of Jerusalem and the problem of refugees. The solution of these key issues is postponed indefinitely by the project, although there is no reason to believe that it will be easier to find solutions to these problems in the future than in the present [16, p. 53]. In the settlement of the Middle East conflict, it is impossible to ignore the positions of the countries surrounding Israel and Palestine. Historically, the Arab world has always been on the side of Palestine, but has not gone beyond its own interests. After the proposal of the "Road Map" as a settlement plan for the Middle East conflict, these countries remained true to their interests and, of course, follow their guidelines in foreign policy. Considering the reaction of the Arab countries, I would like to divide them into two groups. The first group is Jordan and Egypt, whose position is mainly focused on the United States. At the moment, these countries are with Israel is at peace, their recognition of Israel as a State has taken place and is officially documented. Their main task is to convince the Israelis and the Palestinians to accept the Roadmap in its original form, it is about pushing only Israel to accept, because for the Palestinians, in the eyes of these countries, the plan is more profitable. The second group of countries is Lebanon and Syria. In their opinion, the "Road Map" is just another attempt by the United States to bring the situation in the Middle East into a favorable direction for itself. As long as the United States offers plans, the Palestinians will not have the opportunity to speak with Israel on an equal footing [14, p. 194]. The next attempt at a peaceful settlement was the "unilateral disengagement plan" proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Speaking at a conference of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya on December 18, 2003, Ariel Sharon stated that Israel would soon initiate unilateral disengagement, in which part of the Jewish settlements would be relocated from the Palestinian territories [17, p. 247]. Along with the withdrawal of Israeli troops and settlers from the Palestinian territories, Israel declared its readiness to return to the negotiation process, but only on condition that the terror on the part of the Palestinians will be stopped. There are some difficulties in implementing the "unilateral disengagement plan". Firstly, the plan did not identify settlements that would be "relocated", it concerned only those settlements that, under any version of the agreement, would not be included in the State of Israel. It is important to note that it was not about the evacuation of settlements within the framework of a peace treaty with a neighboring Arab country or with the Palestinians, but about a unilateral initiative of the Israeli government, coordinated exclusively with the American administration [18, p. 219]. Secondly, the "unilateral disengagement plan" deepened the split in the Likud party, which actually split into two camps, which was confirmed by the internal party referendum held in May 2004 on the initiative of A. Sharon in order to neutralize the opposition. As a result, more than 60% of the party members voted against the partition of the

party. Thirdly, the disengagement plan has introduced a very strong imbalance into Israeli society itself. There were several groups among the Israeli population who disagreed with the disengagement plan, especially residents of the settlements being dismantled. Soon the settlers took the struggle to the streets of the city and to the media: they organized mass demonstrations and processions. Thus, several tens of thousands of people took part in an unauthorized march to the Gaza Strip and were stopped by large army and police forces in the village of Kfar Maimon [19]. But, despite all the difficulties and obstacles, the program of "unilateral disengagement" was implemented, although it did not bring significant results. After the evacuation of Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip, the intensity of rocket attacks on Israel has sharply increased, and residents resettled from the Gaza Strip have not yet received decent housing [19]. Another attempt to resolve the conflict was the International Conference on Middle East Settlement, which opened on November 27, 2007 in Annapolis (Maryland, USA). The main purpose of the conference was to create conditions for the start of negotiations that will lead to the creation of a Palestinian State. The conference was attended by representatives of more than 40 countries. Despite the fact that representatives of the Hamas movement were not invited to Annapolis, they organized an alternative meeting to the American summit. Leaders of several Palestinian movements, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, gathered in Gaza. Taking into account the opinions of the Israeli and Palestinian sides, it can be concluded that the Annapolis conference turned out to be one of the most unsuccessful conferences. So, at the next meeting of the government, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Planning Avi-gdor Lieberman said about the conference: "We are deceiving ourselves, assuming that the Palestinians will fulfill their promises and will fight with terror. Until now, for some reason, this has not happened" [20]. Representatives of the Palestinian Hamas party also believe that the Middle East Peace Conference in Annapolis and the agreement on the start of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are nothing but a waste of time [21]. Recently, the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has also been complicated by the coming to power in Israel of the government of the leader of the right-wing party Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009, because Netanyahu never spoke in favor of the idea of creating a Palestinian state. Moreover, it is believed that it was B. Netanyahu who buried the "Oslo process" aimed at peaceful disengagement with the Palestinians when he headed the Israeli government for the first time in the 1990s [22]. For the past few years, the entire world community has been watching with horror the events taking place in the Middle East. The wave of "Arab revolutions", which has already swept away government regimes in a number of States, has certainly led to radical changes in the region. Undoubtedly, the unrest has pushed into the background one of the most important problems in the region - the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, the conflict not only remains unresolved, but also periodically breaks out with renewed vigor. Over the past few years, more than a dozen joint attacks have been recorded, as well as a terrorist attack in East Jerusalem on March 23, 2011, where at least 20 people were injured. It should be added to this that changes in the Middle East will necessarily affect the process of resolving the Middle East conflict. As the Government changes in Arab countries, Israel is losing its already few supporters in the region. Palestine, on the contrary, is gaining more and more confidence in its own abilities, which cannot but have a negative impact on the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict. Moreover, it should be noted that the negative perception of the State of Israel in the Arab world is so strong that any changes in the region will only strengthen anti-Israeli sentiments. Even if the new regimes in Arab countries are "moderate", then a warming in Israel's relations with Arab countries is hardly to be expected. In support of these words, I would like to quote the opinion of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which he expressed at a press conference on April 4, 2011 in Tehran. M. Ahmadinejad said: "The wave of Arab revolutions left no chance for the survival of the Zionist regime. All countries where revolutions have taken place are united in opposing the occupation of Palestine" [28]. As for the international community, while the entire Arab world was in turmoil, it, instead of pacifying the rebels, once again began to demand significant concessions from Israel. The UN Security Council has prepared a resolution condemning the construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The draft of

the relevant resolution was submitted to the members of the UN Security Council by a group of Arab States. The document calls on Israel to "comply with its international obligations" and end the block-ade of Giza, as well as on the international community to provide emergency assistance to the Pales- tinian population. However, the document was never adopted due to the US veto [29].

In conclusion, it should be noted that, despite the fact that almost all attempts by the interna- tional community to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict have not led to significant results, a certain breakthrough in this issue can be considered the fact that the parties to the conflict are clearly aware that the settlement should go only by peaceful means. But this is the complexity of the new round in the relations between the parties to the conflict. War is a matter of strategy and tactics, the strongest wins here, and negotiations require certain concessions and sometimes very significant ones. It all depends on when and to what extent the parties will be ready for them. At the moment, it seems that neither side is ready to make significant concessions.

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